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I.  INTRODUCTION
 This matter comes on before this Court on Franklin
Brown’s consolidated appeals from:  (1) a judgment of
conviction and sentence entered by the District Court on
October 15, 2004, reflecting the sentence the Court imposed
4on October 14, 2004; (2) an order denying Brown’s motion
for a new trial entered by the District Court on August 10,
2005; and (3) an order denying Brown’s renewed motion for a
new trial or for dismissal of the indictment entered by the
District Court on February 22, 2008.  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and the
orders denying Brown’s motion for a new trial or dismissal of
the indictment, but will remand the case for Brown’s
resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). 
II.  BACKGROUND
Brown worked for the Rite Aid Corporation, the
operator of a chain of retail drug stores, for more than 30
years, eventually rising to become one of its top executive
officers, before resigning in 2000.  From 1995 until 1999,
while Brown was serving as Rite Aid’s Chief Legal Counsel
and then as a Vice Chairman of its Board of Directors, Martin
Grass was Rite Aid’s Chief Executive Officer.  Under Grass’s
leadership, Rite Aid aggressively expanded its operations by
acquiring and building hundreds of drugstores throughout the
United States.  This expansion seemingly was rewarded with
soaring profits, and Rite Aid’s stock price rose by more than
300% between the date that Grass assumed control of the
company and the beginning of 1999.  
Troubles within Rite Aid surfaced, however, when it
released a statement in March 1999 revealing significantly
lower than expected earnings and higher than expected
Rite Aid did not restate its earnings for fiscal year 1997. 1
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expenses, resulting in its stock losing more than half of its
value in a single day.  After the value of Rite Aid stock
continued to slide over the next several months, the Rite Aid
Board of Directors on October 18, 1999, issued a press release
announcing that Grass was resigning as CEO and that Rite
Aid intended to restate its income negatively for fiscal years
1997-1999.  Rite Aid’s new leadership then launched an
internal investigation that culminated on July 11, 2000, in a
restatement of income of more than one billion dollars for
fiscal years 1998, 1999, and the first quarter of fiscal year
2000.   When Rite Aid made the July 11, 2000 restatement it1
was the largest restatement of corporate income in United
States history.
The Rite Aid problems naturally triggered public
investigations.  Thus, the Securities & Exchange Commission
commenced a civil probe into Rite Aid’s accounting practices
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction with
the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, launched a criminal investigation.  FBI agent
George Delaney and Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”) Kim Douglas Daniel led the criminal investigation.
As the criminal investigation progressed, Brown
retained counsel and notified the government of this
representation.  On February 12, 2001, AUSA Daniel
contacted Brown’s counsel and arranged a meeting between
government representatives and Brown for April 4, 2001.  On
6March 28, 2001, AUSA Daniel faxed Brown’s counsel an
agenda letter setting forth the topics to be discussed at the
April 4 meeting.  Brown, however, became unwilling to meet
with the government, a change in position that led Brown’s
counsel on or about March 30, 2001, to inform AUSA Daniel
that Brown would not consent to participate in the interview.
During the time that the government was
communicating with Brown, it also was in contact with
Timothy Noonan, Rite Aid’s President and Chief Operating
Officer during Grass’s tenure as CEO.  Noonan informed the
government that, in response to Brown’s request, he had
agreed to meet Brown on March 13, 2001.  Noonan agreed to
act as a confidential informant for the government and
surreptitiously record his conversation with Brown.  Agent
Delaney instructed Noonan to steer the conversation towards
the topics listed in the agenda letter that AUSA Daniel had
sent to Brown’s counsel.  Noonan attached a hidden
microphone to his body, met with Brown as planned, and
recorded their conversation.  Pursuant to Noonan’s request,
Brown and Noonan met again on March 30, 2001, and
Noonan again recorded their conversation.  In order to focus
the conversation on topics related to the government’s
investigation, Noonan brought a letter addressed to Noonan’s
counsel signed by AUSA Daniel to the March 30 meeting.
The government created the letter solely for use at that
meeting and it purported to set forth a discussion agenda for
an upcoming meeting between Noonan and the government.
This fictitious letter listed topics of discussion similar to those
in the letter that AUSA Daniel had sent to Brown on March
28, 2001.  
7Noonan also recorded conversations with Brown on
April 1, 2001, April 27, 2001, and May 21, 2001, as well as
his conversation with Grass and Brown on May 2, 2001.
Furthermore, an FBI surveillance team made video tape
recordings of each of Noonan’s conversations with Brown
during this period except for that on April 27.
On June 21, 2002, a grand jury in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania returned a multi-count indictment against
Grass, Brown, Franklyn Bergonzi, and Eric Sorkin arising
from the Rite Aid investigation.  Bergonzi and Sorkin,
respectively, had served as Rite Aid’s Chief Financial Officer
and Vice President in Charge of Pharma Purchasing.  The
indictment charged Brown with numerous counts of
conspiracy, fraud, making false statements to the SEC,
obstruction of justice, and witness tampering.  
Brown was convicted at an ensuing jury trial of
conspiracy to commit accounting fraud, filing false statements
with the SEC, conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of
grand jury proceedings, obstruction of government agency
proceedings, and witness tampering.  In particular, the jury
found that Brown had conspired to inflate Rite Aid’s reported
earnings for fiscal year 1999, had conspired to create
backdated severance letters awarding Brown and other
executives millions of dollars in compensation, and had
interfered with the government’s investigation of Rite Aid in
a variety of ways.  The District Court sentenced Brown to ten
years in prison followed by two years of supervised release.
Grass, Bergonzi, and Sorkin were not tried as they all pleaded2
guilty to certain charges pursuant to agreements with the
government.
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Brown has surrendered to the Bureau of Prisons and presently
is incarcerated.2
III.  JURISDICTION
The District Court had jurisdiction over this federal
criminal action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
jurisdiction to review the judgment of conviction and sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
IV.  DISCUSSION
On this appeal, Brown puts forward a panoply of
reasons that he claims require us either to dismiss his
indictment, grant him a new trial, or remand his case to the
District Court for resentencing though, interestingly, he does
not suggest that the evidence at the trial was insufficient to
support his convictions.  Specifically, Brown maintains that
the District Court:  (1) abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 33 motion based on newly discovered evidence; (2)
improperly denied his pre-trial suppression motion; (3)
abused its discretion and committed plain error by interfering
in the plea negotiation process; and (4) abused its sentencing
The District Court painstakingly set forth the technical details3
with respect to the recordings’ authenticity in its comprehensive
opinion denying Brown’s renewed motion for a new trial.
See United States v. Brown, No. 1:02-CR-00146-2, 2008 WL
510126 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2008).  We do not restate those
details except as necessary for our determination of whether the
District Court’s denial of Brown’s motion challenging the
recordings constituted an abuse of discretion.
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discretion in a variety of ways.  We address each contention
in turn.
A. The Rule 33 Motion  
Brown first argues that we should dismiss his
indictment or grant him a new trial because forensic evidence
suggests that the government tampered with the audio and
video tape recordings of Brown’s conversations with Noonan
prior to disclosing those recordings to Brown and presenting
the altered recordings as evidence at his trial.3
1. The Receipt of the Noonan Tapes
The government on July 24, 2002, shortly after
Brown’s arraignment, sent the attorneys representing Brown
and his co-defendants audio tapes containing copies of the six
surreptitiously recorded Noonan conversations (March 13,
We at times will refer to the audio tapes of the Noonan4
conversations the government sent Brown on July 24, 2002, as
the “July 2002 copies.”
The letter from the FBI states that the March 13 conversation5
could not be transcribed, but Brown and the government agree
that a transcript of the March 13 conversation was disclosed, and
that the missing transcript was that of the March 30
conversation.
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2001; March 30, 2001; April 1, 2001; April 27, 2001; May 2,
2001; and May 21, 2001),  transcripts of each conversation4
except that of March 30, and a composite video tape
consisting of footage taken by an FBI surveillance team of
four of the six Noonan conversations (March 30, 2001; April
1, 2001; May 2, 2001; and May 21, 2001).  In the letter
enclosing these recordings, the government stated that the
poor audio quality of the March 30 tape prevented the
production of a complete transcript at that time.   Then on5
July 30, 2002, the government sent the defense lawyers an
FBI surveillance videotape of the March 13 conversation, and
In order to produce this rough transcript, the government sent6
the tape of the March 30 conversation to an FBI laboratory to be
enhanced.  As we discuss below, the government claims it did
not attempt to produce a more thorough transcript of the March
30 conversation because of the extremely poor audio quality of
the tape and because the government believed the subject matter
of the March 30 conversation to be redundant of the other
recorded conversations.
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a 28-page rough transcript of the March 30 conversation.6
According to Brown, after he reviewed these tapes and
transcripts, he “immediately recognized that there were
radical differences between what [he] observed and heard on
the tapes and what [he] recollected of the conversations.”
App. at 888.  Though Brown considered retaining an expert to
examine the tapes, his trial counsel initially discouraged him
from taking that action, but on or about August 31, 2002,
Brown nevertheless brought three of the six tapes to Bruce E.
Koenig, an audio-forensic expert the FBI formerly employed,
for examination.  After Koenig listened to the tapes for
several hours, he advised Brown that they were less than ideal
samples because they were not originals or first-generation
copies, but that Brown should not “waste [his] money”
pursuing further examination of the tapes because, according
to Koenig, the FBI never tampers with tape-recorded
evidence.  App. at 889.
12
2. Allen’s Preliminary Report
Although Brown claims that he remained convinced
that there were substantial irregularities on the tapes, so far as
we are aware he did not make any further investigation into
the circumstances leading to their preparation to determine
whether his belief was correct until approximately one year
later when in August 2003 he retained forensic expert Stuart
Allen to examine the audio tapes of the March 13 and March
30 conversations.  After conducting a digital examination of
the tapes, Allen provided Brown with a “Preliminary Forensic
Examination Report,” dated September 17, 2003, containing
the following preliminary conclusions with respect to the
tapes of both conversations:
Preliminary digital findings indicate that the
audiocassettes examined in our laboratory were
copies made from a digital original and contain
anomalies of unknown origin. . . .
The preliminary forensic examination of this
subject tape identified several anomalies of
unknown origin, however the results are
inconclusive, since the examination was
performed on a copy as previously stated and
not the original.  The anomalies observed may
have been the result of a faulty duplication
process or some other unknown process yet to
be identified.
As we explain below the trial had been scheduled to start in7
June 2003 but was delayed because of circumstances
surrounding an attempt to reach a plea agreement.
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Therefore it is the professional opinion of this
examiner that the original recording device and
the original media associated with the subject
recording, be produced and delivered for non-
destructive forensic examination at this
laboratory.
App. at 1165, 1167, 1168 (emphasis in original).  Shortly after
receiving Allen’s report and three days prior to the date that
jury selection was set to begin in Brown’s trial, one of his
lawyers sent an email message to AUSA Daniel inquiring
whether it would be possible for Allen to examine the original
tapes of the March 13 and March 30 conversations at Allen’s
place of business.   AUSA Daniel responded the next business7
day, September 22, 2003, stating “you gotta be kidding,” and
asking Brown’s attorney to call him to discuss the request.
App. at 1169.  We are uncertain of AUSA Daniel’s reason for
taking that approach to Brown’s request, though it may have
reflected exasperation at the timing of the request. 
3. The Evidence at Trial
14
The District Court empaneled Brown’s jury on
September 25, 2003, and the presentation of evidence  began
the next day.  The trial transcript indicates that early in the
proceedings Brown’s defense counsel stated to the Court that
Brown had “some nagging concerns about the technical
aspects of the tapes,” but acknowledged that the defense had
raised these concerns with the government, and that “[t]he
government has been completely cooperative in terms of
providing [the defense] with what [it] need[s].”  App. at 463.
Defense counsel then agreed with the government that the
Court should admit the tapes provisionally subject to Brown’s
right to object to technical aspects of the tapes if an expert
examination of them later provided a ground for the objection.
During the government’s case-in-chief, it displayed to
the jury a presentation consisting of a video display of
portions of the recorded Noonan conversations, synchronized
with the matching audio recordings and a rolling transcript of
the conversation projected across the screen (the “jury
presentation”).  The government had provided digital copies
of the jury presentation to defense counsel several months in
advance of trial.  At the close of the prosecution’s case, the
government moved to admit into evidence the audio and
video tapes of the Noonan conversations on which the
government based its jury presentation.  In so doing, the
government noted that it had not shown the actual tapes to the
jury but, instead, had shown it a computerized presentation
generated from the tapes.  
According to the  government, it did not rely on or
move to admit a tape of the March 30 conversation because
We at times will refer to the tapes of the March 13, March 30,8
and May 21 conversations that the government made available
to Owen at the FBI’s Harrisburg office as the “Harrisburg
tapes.”  We sometimes will refer to the copies of the Harrisburg
tapes that Owen downloaded onto his laptop as the “Owen
laptop copies.”
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the recording from that date was largely inaudible, and, in any
event, the subject of the March 30 conversation was
duplicative of the other recorded Noonan conversations.  The
defense stated the government had given it an opportunity to
review the tapes along with the digital presentation, and the
defense agreed that they were accurate representations of the
events recorded.  The defense did not voice any objection to
the tapes being admitted into evidence, but again reserved the
right to object later to technical aspects of the tapes.  The
District Court admitted the tapes into evidence. 
4. Owen’s Report
During the trial, the FBI transported the original reel-
to-reel analog tapes of the March 13, March 30, and May 21
conversations to its office in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where
an FBI agent met with defense expert Tom Owen and allowed
Owen to inspect, photograph, and download copies of the
tapes onto Owen’s laptop.   After conducting a physical and8
electronic inspection of the downloaded copies that consisted
of “[c]ritical listening, tape enhancement, spectrum analysis,
[and] speed correction,” Owen issued a final report dated
Pursuant to the All Writs Act, “[t]he Supreme Court and all9
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  28 U.S.C. §
16
October 12, 2003, concluding that the recordings of the three
conversations he examined were “original and authentic
within the conversation, but contain some very questionable
recording procedures and anomalies.”  App. at 1204, 1206.
Owen’s report indicated that both the March 13 and March 30
tapes had been started and stopped a number of times before
the actual recording began, but that the internal integrity of
the recorded conversations was intact.  The report also noted
that the conversation recorded on the March 30 tape was at
times unintelligible.    
5. The Motion under the All-Writs Act 
 Brown did not call an audio forensic expert as a
witness during his trial to challenge the authenticity of the
Noonan tapes, and he did not object to the tapes being
admitted into evidence.  Nevertheless, following his
conviction on October 17, 2003, Brown, aided by a new team
of attorneys, continued to examine the tapes of the Noonan
conversations for signs of hidden edits or inaccuracies.  On
July 7, 2004, Brown filed a motion under the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, to place under seal and compel the
examination and review of the original audio and video
recordings of the Noonan conversations.   In his motion,9
1651.  
It is unclear from the record whether Allen’s and Owen’s10
reports submitted in support of Brown’s motion are those of
September 17, 2003, and October 12, 2003, respectively.  But
we are not concerned with this uncertainty because Brown is not
appealing from the District Court’s denial of his motion under
the All Writs Act.
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Brown argued that further examination, made subsequently to
the trial, of the Owen laptop copies had “uncovered
significant anomalies (suspicious acoustic events) which call
into question the authenticity and originality of these tapes.”
App. at 636.  In support of his motion, Brown attached reports
from Allen and Owen and an affidavit from James Reames, a
former FBI forensic technician.   10
In a Memorandum and Order dated August 16, 2004,
the District Court denied Brown’s motion because (1) the
Court found the timing of the motion suspect, (2) Brown did
not make any suggestion that there were anomalies in the jury
presentation, which was the only evidence actually considered
by the jury, and (3) Brown’s experts contended that only the
third-generation copies—i.e., copies of the Owen laptop
copies—contained anomalies in the conversation portion of
the tapes.  Because Owen’s initial examination of the Owen
laptop copies revealed anomalies only at the beginning of the
tapes before the conversations began, the Court concluded
that anomalies found in the conversation portions of later
generation copies were a product of duplication error. 
The audio tapes of the Noonan conversations originally were11
recorded onto an analog recording device known as a Nagra
SNST recorder.  Federal law prohibits the possession of such
recorders by private persons.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b); App.
at 1565.
Although we refer to the May 31, 2005 motion as the initial12
motion for a new trial, Brown had filed an earlier motion for a
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 and a new
trial pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 on more conventional
grounds than those we discuss here.  The District Court denied
that motion on May 6, 2004, and Brown does not appeal from
that order.  Therefore we do not discuss that motion further.
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6. The Initial Motion for a New Trial
Even though he had been convicted and the Court had
denied his motion under the All Writs Act, Brown continued
to employ Owen, Allen, and Reames to test the Owen laptop
copies and the jury presentation.  On May 31, 2005, Brown
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, or in the alternative, for (1) an order directing the
government to produce to the defense for testing the original
Nagra recorder and original Nagra SNST reel-to-reel audio
tapes,  and the original VHS camcorder and VHS video tapes11
of conversations between Brown and Noonan, and (2) an
evidentiary hearing.   In support of this motion, Brown12
averred that his defense experts, “meticulously” had tested the
Owen laptop copies and the jury presentation, and had
concluded after “painstaking, time-consuming work” that the
19
Harrisburg tapes proffered to Owen at the FBI offices were
not original recordings, and that anomalies associated with
computerized editing found in the Owen laptop copies and the
jury presentation suggested that the government had edited
both the Harrisburg tapes and the jury presentation.
Consequently, Brown believed that the Harrisburg tapes and
the jury presentation could not be deemed true and accurate
records of the events that took place on the dates in question. 
The government and the defense subsequently entered
into an agreement, memorialized in an August 8, 2005 letter
from defense counsel to AUSA Daniel, in which it agreed to
provide the defense with the original audio and video tapes of
the March 13, March 30, and May 21 Noonan conversations,
a new set of FBI created first-generation duplicates of these
recordings, the original Nagra SNST recorder on which the
audio recordings of the conversations initially were made, and
an additional working Nagra recorder.  The letter agreement
expressed the government’s belief that the process of
production should take no more than two weeks.  On August
10, 2005, after being notified of the agreement, the District
Court denied Brown’s motion as moot, noting it also would
be premature to rule on the motion at that time because
Brown still was determining what, if any, newly discovered
evidence existed. 
7. The Renewed Motion for a New Trial
The government on November 9, 2005, released to the
defense the original tapes of the March 13, March 30, and
We at times will refer to the original tapes that the government13
released to the defense on November 9, 2005, as the “November
2005 tapes” and the first-generation digital copies released on
the same date as the “FBI Archive copies.”
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May 21 conversations, as well as a set of first-generation
digital copies of those tapes that the FBI made.   After13
extensive examination, testing, and comparison by Brown’s
experts of the July 2002 copies, the Owen laptop copies, the
November 2005 tapes, the FBI archive copies, the original
Nagra SNST recorder, and the video tapes used to create the
jury presentation, Brown presented his experts’ findings in
support of a renewed Rule 33 motion for a new trial that he
filed with the District Court on September 28, 2006.  
According to Brown, these findings  “confirmed what
[he] suspected all along: the government intentionally
withheld exculpatory material from the defense and
misrepresented the authenticity of the tapes furnished to the
defense and incorporated in the Jury Presentation.”  App. at
1231.  Specifically, Brown contended that the government
took the original analog recordings of the Noonan
conversations, recorded them onto a digital format, deleted
material exculpatory to Brown, and recorded the edited
versions of the conversations from the digital format back
onto the original analog reels.  The government then
presented modified analog tapes to the defense as originals
(the Harrisburg tapes and the November 2005 tapes) or as the
source of the generational copies that were presented to the
defense (the July 2002 tapes and the FBI Archive copies) and
used to create the jury presentation.  Additionally, Brown
The Supreme Court held in Brady that “the suppression by the14
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.”  373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97.  “The
Supreme Court has outlined a three-part test to determine if a
Brady violation has occurred: ‘The evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued.’”  Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 108
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124
S.Ct. 1256, 1272 (2004)). 
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) provides that “[a]fter a witness called by15
the United States has testified on direct examination, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to
provide any statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the
United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified. . . .”
21
averred in his motion that the November 2005 tape of the
March 30 conversation “is far more audible” than previously
disclosed recordings of the conversation, and that the newly
audible portions of that conversation contained exculpatory
material.  App. at 1231-32.  Brown alleged that the
government violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963),  and the Jencks Act, 1814
U.S.C. § 3500,  by failing to disclose a full transcript or an15
audible version of the March 30 conversation. 
22
In support of his renewed motion, Brown submitted
new reports and affidavits from Reames, Allen, Owen, and a
forensic video expert, Grant Fredericks.  These submissions
included two new transcriptions of the March 30
conversation, one prepared by Reames (the “Reames
transcript”) and another prepared by Allen (the “Allen
transcript”).  Brown claimed these transcripts revealed
exculpatory material not disclosed previously.  
Specifically, Brown argued that both transcripts
revealed statements contradicting Noonan’s trial testimony
about a computer the SEC subpoenaed that allegedly had been
used to create backdated severance letters.  At trial, Noonan
testified that Brown had stated in the March 30 conversation
that the SEC “will never get [the] computer now.  It is in the
Atlantic.”  App. at 1249.  In the Reames and Allen transcripts,
however, this statement does not appear and it is Noonan who
first mentions the Atlantic Ocean.  Reames transcribed the
relevant exchange as follows:
FRANKLIN BROWN: There are [. .] [. .]
working on it.
TIMOTHY NOONAN: I n  t h e  A t l a n t i c
Ocean, huh?
FRANKLIN BROWN: That was just an       
                                             expression on his     
                                             part . .
TIMOTHY NOONAN: I understand that.
23
App. at 1426.  The conversation is transcribed similarly in the
Allen transcript:
TIMOTHY:       OK Gottcha. (inaudible)
FRANKLIN:      Wo’ What (inaudible)
TIMOTHY:      It’s in the Atlantic Ocean!!! --- 
    (pause).
FRANKLIN:      That was just an expression on 
                            his part.  That’s the equivalent 
                            .. (inaudible)
TIMOTHY:       I understand that
App. at 2633.  Brown also claimed that the Reames transcript
contained Brown’s previously undisclosed statements
encouraging Noonan to be forthright in his discussions with
the government.  On appeal, however, Brown appears to
concede that these statements were urging Noonan to be
candid with Noonan’s defense attorney, and at least were not
urging Noonan directly to be candid with the government
investigators.  See Appellant’s Op. Br. at 61.
In Allen’s reports and affidavits submitted with
Brown’s motion, Allen explained his testing methodology and
noted a number of anomalies on the different recordings.
Allen’s findings left him unable to “eliminate the possibility”
that the November 2005 tapes were not recorded
24
contemporaneously with the events taking place in them, or
that the recordings originated from a digital source instead of
the analog recording device that the government purportedly
used.   App. at 1272-73; App. at 2571.  Additionally, Allen
concluded “with a high degree of certainty” that the July 2002
copies and the Owen laptop copies differed considerably from
the November 2005 tapes and the FBI archive copies, such
that it would be “reasonable” to conclude that the November
2005 and FBI archive copies were, in fact, different
recordings than the earlier disclosed copies.  App. at 1273-74;
App. at 2572-73.  
Owen’s materials contained similar findings.  He
concluded that the November 2005 tapes showed evidence of
previous digitization inconsistent with an analog recording.
Owen also was “not able to eliminate the possibility” that the
Owen laptop copies and FBI archive copies originated from
different sources.  App. at 2675.  Allen and Owen also
concluded that the video tapes that the government provided
of the Noonan conversations contained evidence of editing.
Fredericks, in his affidavit, concluded that the video
tapes the government provided to the defense were accurate
originals, but that they had been converted into digital files
and edited in order to create the jury presentation in such a
manner that the resultant product was an “inaccurate and
visually impaired reproduction” of the original video tapes.
App. at 1468.  Fredericks also concluded  that the “[a]udio to
video alignment of the DVD Jury Presentation was
misaligned to such a degree that when the mouths of the men
were moving, what was being heard by the jury, was not what
they were actually saying at that exact time.”  App. at 1468.
25
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on
Brown’s renewed Rule 33 motion on May 14 and 15, 2007.
Over these two days, the District Court heard testimony from
defense experts Owen and Allen, the government’s FBI
expert David Snyder, as well as from other persons including
FBI case agents who had worked on the Rite Aid
investigation.  The government then sought an adjournment to
seek discovery of the defense experts’ test results and the
District Court adjourned the hearing to allow additional
discovery.  The hearing resumed on August 13 and 14, 2007,
and at that time the District Court again heard testimony from
witnesses including Owen, Allen, Snyder, and Paul Ginsberg,
a forensic audio consultant, who presented expert testimony
on behalf of the government.  Over the course of the four days
of hearings, the District Court heard testimony from a total of
nine witnesses and accepted 27 exhibits into evidence.  
On February 22, 2008, the District Court entered an
order denying Brown’s renewed motion for a new trial.  In its
comprehensive accompanying Memorandum, the Court
detailed the history of the various recordings made of the
Noonan conversations as well as the evidence the numerous
experts proffered, and concluded that the tapes the
government provided were authentic, and that the government
did not submit false evidence or perjured testimony to the
jury.  The Court also found that the Reames and Allen
transcripts of the March 30 conversation did not contain
exculpatory or impeaching information, and it therefore held
that the government had not committed a Brady or Jencks Act
violation in delaying the delivery of an audible recording or
transcript of that conversation.  The Court also concluded that
a new trial was unwarranted because Brown’s supposed “new
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evidence”—a transcript of the previously inaudible March 30
statements—was not in fact newly discovered.  See United
States v. Brown, No. 1:02-CR-00146-2, 2008 WL 510126, at
*28 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2008).
8. The District Court Did Not Abuse its
Discretion
We will reverse a denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence only if we conclude
that the district court abused its discretion in denying the
motion.  United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir.
2000).  We have explained that “a district court abuses its
discretion if its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application
of law to fact.”  Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498
(3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon
the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment
and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.”
Our precedents instruct that five requirements must be met
before a district court may grant a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence: 
(a) the evidence must be in fact, newly
discovered, i.e., discovered since the
trial; 
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(b) facts must be alleged from which the
court may infer diligence on the part of
the movant; 
(c) the evidence relied on, must not be
merely cumulative or impeaching;
(d) it must be material to the issues involved; and
(e) it must be such, and of such nature, as
that, on a new trial, the newly discovered
evidence would probably produce an
acquittal. 
United States. v. Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1976)).  A movant seeking a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence bears a “heavy burden” in proving
each of these requirements.  Id. (citing Saada, 212 F.3d at
216).
We find no basis to conclude that the District Court
abused its discretion in denying Brown’s Rule 33 motion.
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Brown
through his epic efforts after the trial satisfied the first four
Iannelli factors listed above, in light of the Court’s properly
found facts, Brown failed to prove that his newly discovered
Actually it is questionable whether the evidence Brown16
presents in his attempt to show that the tapes had been altered is
“newly discovered,” and whether he was diligent in seeking it
before the trial.  If there had been alterations in the tapes as
Brown believes, he should have known of them when he first
heard the tapes and, indeed, he contends that he suspected from
the outset that the tapes were inaccurate.  Thus, he could have
and should have developed his expert testimony before the trial.
Instead, based on the advice of counsel, he did not take steps
prior to trial to demonstrate that the tapes contained alterations
of the sort allegedly discovered following his conviction.
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evidence probably would result in his acquittal at a new
trial.  16
After considering voluminous amounts of briefing,
expert reports, and live testimony, the District Court made a
factual finding that the various tapes of the Noonan
conversations had not been “edited, altered, digitized, or
manipulated by the government at any time,” and that,
accordingly, “[t]hey [were] authentic recordings.”  Brown,
2008 WL 510126, at *25.  Brown claims that this finding of
authenticity was clearly erroneous because (1) the Court
based the finding solely on Ginsburg’s expert testimony and
the Court should not have allowed Ginsburg to testify, (2)
even considering Ginsburg’s testimony, the evidence did not
support the finding of authenticity, and (3) evidence of breaks
in the tapes’ chain-of-custody further undermined the finding
of authenticity.
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Brown argues with respect to the first point that the
government’s request for an adjournment of the evidentiary
hearing and subsequent use of Ginsburg as an expert was part
of “a subterfuge seemingly designed to avoid having an FBI
agent testify under oath that the tapes had not been altered,”
and that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing
the government to engage in this subterfuge.  Appellant’s Op.
Br. at 40.  We are perplexed by this argument because, as the
District Court found, there was testimony from FBI agents
that the tapes had not been altered.  In any event, the
government claims that it sought the adjournment to obtain
the test results from Owen and Allen in order to cross-
examine them effectively, and that it based its decision to use
Ginsburg on a perceived need to counter Brown’s evolving
allegations of evidence tampering with testimony from an
independent expert, as opposed to testimony from a
government employee (i.e., Snyder).  Ultimately, the Court
granted the adjournment to allow additional discovery,
required Snyder to testify, and allowed Ginsburg to testify.
The Court went to great lengths to consider all the evidence
relevant to the issues before it, and we cannot conclude that
the Court abused its discretion in making its determination to
allow Ginsburg’s testimony over Brown’s objection, in
addition to that of Snyder, Owen, Allen, and the other
witnesses.
We also are unable to find any error in the District
Court’s conclusion that the tapes were authentic.  As the
Court noted, Brown’s experts’ detailed findings led them only
to the lukewarm conclusions that it would be “reasonable” to
believe that earlier disclosed recordings of the Noonan
conversations came from a different source than the
We see no reason with respect to the chain-of-custody issues17
Brown raises to second-guess the District Court’s determination
that the testimony of the government’s witnesses on this point
was credible.
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November 2005 tapes, and that the possibility the recordings
were inauthentic could not be eliminated.  While a different
fact-finder might have reached a conclusion contrary to the
one the Court reached, the record by no means compels a
conclusion that the tapes were inauthentic.  Given the history
of the proceedings and the conflicting expert testimony, both
between the government and defense experts and among the
defense experts themselves, we cannot conclude that the
Court clearly erred by finding the challenged tapes were
authentic.17
It also is important to consider that, as the District
Court explained, it had evidence “from the FBI agents, that
they did not themselves, or cause another person to, edit, alter,
or modify the original tapes except to attempt enhancement”
and that this testimony “was credible.”  Brown, 2008 WL
510126, at *25.  Certainly in the face of somewhat conflicting
expert testimony this lay evidence was important and the
Court could rely on it.
Even were we to reject the District Court’s finding and
hold the tapes inauthentic, Brown does not demonstrate, or
even seriously contend, that any of the conversations
allegedly removed by the government from the Noonan tapes
actually was exculpatory, much less that their admission as
trial evidence probably would have resulted in his acquittal.
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Moreover, even if we presumed that the government would
not expend the effort to tamper with evidence in the manner
ascribed to it by Brown to remove statements that were not
exculpatory, Brown still bears the “heavy burden” of
demonstrating that his newly discovered evidence probably
would result in his acquittal at a new trial, and he simply did
not meet this burden.  Assuming Brown’s argument to be that
if we make a finding that the tapes were inauthentic the
consequence would be the suppression of all of the video and
audio recordings of the Noonan conversations, it does not
follow a fortiori that a new trial without the recordings
probably would result in Brown’s acquittal, or that the
original trial would have had a different outcome if the video
and audio recordings had been excluded from evidence at that
trial.  As the District Court noted, Noonan testified at trial
about his conversations with Brown, and “was cross
examined thoroughly, on all topics that might impugn his
credibility.”  Brown, 2008 WL 510126, at *28.  The Court
described the evidence at trial of Brown’s guilt to be
“concrete, credible, and more than sufficient to sustain his
conviction.”  Id.  On appeal, Brown fails to challenge this
observation and plausibly explain how the absence of the
Noonan tapes would have rendered the evidence at his
original trial or would render the evidence at a new trial less
than sufficient to sustain his conviction. 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion with
respect to the allegedly exculpatory statements in the Reames
and Allen transcripts of the March 30 conversation that the
statements were, at best, neutral as to Brown’s guilt or
innocence and not exculpatory.  The statements regarding the
Atlantic Ocean do not contradict substantially Noonan’s
Frequently our review of criminal cases makes it clear that the18
government’s resources devoted to the trial exceeded those of
the defendant.  This case does not seem to be within that
category.
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testimony on which Brown’s counsel thoroughly cross-
examined him at the trial.  Moreover, we disagree with
Brown’s argument that because attorneys have ethical
obligations not to suborn perjury, see Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157, 171-74, 106 S.Ct. 988, 996-97 (1986), Brown’s
statement urging Noonan to be candid with Noonan’s lawyer
is akin to a statement urging Noonan to confess wrongdoing
at Rite Aid to the government.  Therefore, even if the
government could have produced a more audible version of
the March 30 conversation, it is unlikely that the use of this
version would have led to Brown’s acquittal at his trial or
would lead to his acquittal at a new trial.  For the same
reason, we agree with the District Court that the government
did not commit a Brady violation and that any violation of the
Jencks Act amounted to harmless error.  
Finally, Brown’s evidence with respect to the video
tapes and the jury presentation suggests only that the
government could have created a more polished presentation
if it had the resources of Brown and his experts at its
disposal.   At trial, Brown conceded that the video tapes and18
jury presentation were accurate representations of the events
recorded, and, on appeal, Brown does not offer any evidence
which could give rise to an inference that exculpatory
material on the video tapes somehow was hidden from him.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order denying Brown’s
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motion for a new trial entered by the District Court on August
10, 2005, and the order denying Brown’s renewed motion for
a new trial or for dismissal of the indictment entered by the
District Court on February 22, 2008. 
B. The Pre-Trial Suppression Motion
Prior to the trial, Grass and Brown filed a motion to
suppress the tapes of the Noonan conversations, arguing that
the government had obtained them in violation of the 1998
“McDade Amendment,” the provisions of which we describe
below, by reason of AUSA Daniel, a government lawyer,
having violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct by using Noonan as his proxy to elicit information
from Grass and Brown about the subject matter of the
government’s investigation prior to their indictment but at a
time when Daniel knew that they were represented by counsel
with respect to that investigation.  After holding a suppression
hearing, the District Court issued an opinion on January 13,
2003, denying Grass’s and Brown’s motion.  The Court held
that AUSA Daniel had not committed an ethical violation by
using Noonan as a confidential informant, and that, even if he
had done so, suppression was not an appropriate remedy for
the violation.  See United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d
535, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2003).  We review a district court’s denial
of a suppression motion for clear error as to the underlying
facts, but exercise plenary review with respect to legal
findings made in light of the district court’s properly found
facts.  United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir.
An August 23, 2004 order amended Rule 4.2 to substitute19
“person” for “party” and “to do so by law or a court order” for
“by law to do so.”  Pa. R. of Prof’l Conduct 4.2, historical notes.
34
2006) (citing United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d
Cir. 2003)).  
At the time of the alleged violations, Rule 4.2 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, known as the
“no-contact rule,” provided:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to
be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
Pa. R. Prof’l Conduct 4.2.   Rule 8.4(a) provides that an19
attorney has engaged in misconduct if he violates the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct through the acts
of another.  Pa. R. of Prof’l Conduct 8.4.   Pursuant to the
McDade Amendment an attorney that the federal government
employs is subject to the ethical rules in each state where such
attorney engages in that attorney’s duties to the same extent
and in the same manner as any other attorney in that state.  28
U.S.C. § 530B(a).  Accordingly, AUSA Daniel, a federal
prosecutor in this Pennsylvania-based prosecution, was bound
by Rule 4.2 at all times relevant to this appeal, and he
ethically was not permitted to violate Rule 4.2 through the
acts of a surrogate.
The New Jersey rule provided at the time of Balter that “[i]n20
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless authorized
by law to do so.”  Balter, 91 F.3d at 435 (quoting N.J. R. of
Prof’l Conduct 4.2).
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The government does not dispute seriously that at the
time the Noonan conversations were recorded, Brown was a
“party” within the meaning of Rule 4.2 as that rule is
interpreted in Pennsylvania, or that Brown was represented by
counsel and AUSA Daniel was aware of that representation.
The question before us then is whether AUSA Daniel was
“authorized by law” to use a confidential informant to
communicate with a represented suspect in the course of a
pre-indictment investigation.  Relying largely on our decision
in United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1996), the
District Court answered this question in the affirmative.  
In Balter, we found that a federal prosecutor did not
violate New Jersey’s no-contact rule  when he used a20
confidential informant to contact a represented person in the
course of a pre-indictment investigation.  We reached that
conclusion because the rule did not apply to a criminal
suspect prior to the commencement of adversarial
proceedings against the suspect, and that even if the rule did
apply, “pre-indictment investigation by prosecutors is
precisely the type of contact exempted from the Rule as
‘authorized by law.’”  See id. at 435-36.  After noting that
New Jersey case law supported this latter point, we stated:
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Prohibiting prosecutors from investigating an
unindicted suspect who has retained counsel
would serve only to insulate certain classes of
suspects f rom ordinary pre-indictment
investigation.  Furthermore, such a rule would
significantly hamper legitimate law enforcement
operations by making it very difficult to
investigate certain individuals.
Id. at 436.  We then observed that decisions of every other
court of appeals to have considered a similar case have
supported this conclusion except for a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.  Id.  (citing United States v.
Powe, 9 F.3d 68 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903
F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d
1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84
(8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1979)).  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded in United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-40
(2d Cir. 1988), that a federal prosecutor overstepped the
boundaries of legitimate pre-indictment investigation by
preparing a false grand jury subpoena to aid a confidential
informant elicit admissions from a represented suspect.
Brown contends that Balter is distinguishable from this
case because it dealt with the New Jersey rather than
Pennsylvania ethical rules, was decided prior to the enactment
of the McDade Amendment, and the government’s conduct in
the present case is far more egregious than the government’s
conduct in Balter.  We find these distinctions unavailing.  To
begin, New Jersey’s no-contact rule is virtually identical to
Pennsylvania’s, and both states have derived their version of
We note that New Jersey’s rule has been interpreted to apply21
only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings,
whereas Pennsylvania’s rule is not so limited.  See  Balter, 91
F.3d at 436 (citing State v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 589 A.2d 180,
183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)). This distinction in the
overall coverage of the two rules, however, has no bearing on
the scope of the “authorized by law” exception found in both
rules, although in this case the alleged violation took place prior
to the initiation of adversarial proceedings.  It is worth noting,
however, that in New Jersey there would be that additional
reason to hold that there had not been an ethical violation in the
circumstances of this case.
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the rule from the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.   See Balter, 91 F.3d at 435 n.4.  We21
recognize that Brown correctly points out that we supported
our holding in Balter that pre-indictment investigations by
prosecutors were “authorized by law” with a citation to a
decision from an intermediate New Jersey state appellate
court for which there is no analogous Pennsylvania decision.
See id. at 436 (citing State v. Porter, 510 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)).  But our conclusion in Balter did
not rest solely on the New Jersey state court decision and we
do not believe the absence of an analogous Pennsylvania
decision renders any less compelling our observations
regarding the negative consequences that would follow from
an outcome contrary to that we reach here.
We recognize that Congress passed the McDade
Amendment in part to combat perceived abuses by federal
prosecutors and require them to comply with state no-contact
At least Brown has not cited to us any Pennsylvania case so22
holding and our research has not revealed that there is any such
case.
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rules.  See generally Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics
Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 Harvard L.
Rev. 2080 (2000).  But Congress did not enlarge on the type
of conduct that state rules forbid.  Our inquiry therefore
would be no different if AUSA Daniel had been a state
prosecutor and we were entertaining an appeal from a state
court conviction.  Nevertheless Brown argues that the
McDade Amendment “supersedes cases such as Balter by
making a particular state’s rules, rather than general principles
of ethics, applicable to the conduct of the federal prosecutor,”
and that, accordingly, AUSA Daniel ran afoul of Rule 4.2
because of the absence of a Pennsylvania statute or court
decision expressly authorizing the conduct in which he
engaged.  Appellant’s Op. Br. at 69.  But we reject his
argument because we do not believe the McDade Amendment
prohibits federal prosecutors in Pennsylvania from using a
well-established investigatory technique simply because the
Pennsylvania courts have not considered whether such
conduct is permissible.  After all, the Pennsylvania courts
have not held that such conduct is impermissible.22
Finally, though we acknowledge that the government’s
conduct in investigating Brown gives us pause, we do not
regard it as so egregious that it falls outside the realm of
acceptable pre-indictment investigation.  Although the
government created a fictitious letter addressed to Noonan’s
counsel that Noonan showed to Brown in order to guide the
We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that even if23
there had been an ethical violation, suppression would not have
been the appropriate remedy.  See, e.g., Hammad, 858 F.2d at
841-42 (although prosecutor had violated New York’s no-
contact rule by using “sham” grand jury subpoena to elicit
admissions from represented suspect, the district court abused
its discretion by ordering suppression as result of violation).
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topics of the March 30 conversation, Brown voluntarily
agreed to the March 30 meeting with Noonan, the
government’s letter did not invoke the authority of the District
Court or contain any forged signatures, the letter was not
addressed to Brown, and the letter in no way purported to
compel any action or inaction on Brown’s behalf.
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that AUSA
Daniel did not violate Rules 4.2 and 8.4(a) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.  Inasmuch as
Brown, or for that matter any other government agent, did not
commit an ethical violation in this case with respect to the
fictitious letter or the March 30 meeting, the District Court
properly denied Brown’s pre-trial suppression motion.   23
C. The Plea Agreement 
Brown next seeks a vacatur of his sentence and a
remand for resentencing in accordance with a proposed plea
agreement that he reached with the government because of the
manner in which the District Court dealt with the agreement.
Specifically, Brown argues that the District Court violated
Sorkin pled guilty on June 26, 2003.24
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by
participating in the plea discussions between Brown and the
government, and that the Court abused its discretion by
improperly rejecting the plea agreement.  If the Court had
accepted the plea agreement the sentence that it could have
imposed would have been shorter than the sentence it did
impose following Brown’s conviction at trial.
1. The Terms of the Agreement
By June 17, 2003, Grass and Bergonzi had entered into
plea agreements with the government and agreed to cooperate
in its investigation.  Pursuant to the agreements, Bergonzi
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy, and Grass pled guilty
to two counts of conspiracy.   On June 24, 2003, several days24
before Brown’s trial was set to begin before Judge Sylvia H.
Rambo, Brown also entered into a plea agreement with the
government.  Under this agreement, Brown agreed to plead
guilty to one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, an
offense carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of five
years.  The government agreed that upon entry of Brown’s
guilty plea, it would move to dismiss all of the remaining
counts in the indictment against him.  
The plea agreement further provided that if Brown
adequately could demonstrate his acceptance of
responsibility, the government would move at sentencing for
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a 3-level reduction in Brown’s offense level under the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (the “Sentencing
Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) because Brown had “assisted
authorities in the investigation and prosecution of his own
misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to
enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to
avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and
the court to allocate its resources efficiently.”  App. at 439.
The agreement also took into account Brown’s pledge to
cooperate with the government in its ongoing investigation
and prosecution of the Rite Aid matter, and raised the
possibility that if the government believed Brown had
rendered it “substantial assistance,” the government would
recommend, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, that the District Court impose a sentence on
Brown below the applicable Guidelines range.
2. Judge Rambo’s Letter
After receiving a courtesy copy of Brown’s plea
agreement on June 25, Judge Rambo sent a letter to AUSA
Daniel, with a carbon copy to Brown’s trial counsel, stating
the following:
As you are aware, I have decided to reject the
proposed plea agreement which has been
forwarded to my chambers.  However, I will
accept Mr. Brown’s plea of guilty to Count 33
[for conspiracy to obstruct justice].  Attached to
this letter, you will find a statement of reasons
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for rejecting the agreement.  I am planning on
reading this statement in open court tomorrow.
If you should have any questions, please contact
me. 
App. at 25.  In the attached statement of reasons, Judge
Rambo recited that the plea agreement was unacceptably
lenient given the diverse range of serious crimes with which
Brown was charged.  Judge Rambo further found
“particularly nauseating” the portion of the agreement
indicating that Brown’s timely acceptance of responsibility
had allowed the government and the Court to allocate its
resources efficiently.  Judge Rambo understandably took that
view of the acceptance of responsibility provision of the plea
agreement because Brown did not agree to plead guilty until
almost the eve of trial, i.e., between two and eight years after
the conduct at issue took place.  After noting that the
government’s proposal to drop all the other charges against
Brown “essentially caps his prison sentence at 60 months,”
Judge Rambo stated that the proposed plea agreement “does
nothing to eviscerate” the public’s “perception that white
collar defendants are given preferential treatment in our
system of justice.”  App. at 29-30.  Judge Rambo concluded
her statement of reasons for rejecting the plea agreement by
stating: “I must distance myself and the judiciary from this
agreement.  I will not accept this plea agreement.”  App. at
30.
3. The Chambers Meeting
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The following morning on June 26, 2003, Judge
Rambo held a meeting in her chambers to discuss Brown’s
plea situation with Brown’s trial defense team and
representatives from the United States Attorney’s Office,
including United States Attorney Thomas Marino.  Obviously
Judge Rambo’s letter with the statement of reasons for
rejecting the plea agreement had jolted the attorneys in the
case.  Brown’s lead trial counsel, Reid Weingarten, began the
meeting by explaining that as a result of Judge Rambo’s
letter, Brown was unwilling to plead guilty because he no
longer believed he had a “fair shot” to argue for leniency in
sentencing from the District Court.  Id. at 453.  Weingarten
requested a continuance of the trial “to catch our breath” and
attempt to “salvage th[e] deal.”  App. at 452.  The government
joined the defense’s request for a continuance.  
Over the course of the meeting, Marino made three
statements that Brown characterizes as references to an ex
parte conversation about Brown’s case that  the United States
Attorney’s Office had with Judge Rambo June 25, 2003.  In
one reference, Marino stated, “As an aside, I had a concern
when the Court raised an issue — what you said to us
yesterday as to was I giving away the farm?  Because there is
nothing I want more in this case than the Court to say that this
is a fair and just agreement.”  Id. at 459.  Marino then asked
whether a “preliminary guideline check” that Judge Rambo
stated the Court had made with the Probation Office had
resulted in a Sentencing Guidelines calculation different from
that the government had provided in the plea agreement.  Id.
at 458-59.  After Judge Rambo indicated that the Probation
Office indeed had come up with a different calculation,
Marino responded, “That is what I think the problem is.  I am
44
hoping that the facts we discussed with the Court yesterday
and facts that we may be able to bring to the Court’s attention
in the future once we get — if we do get these continuances
will resolve that matter.”  Id. at 460.  Brown’s attorney did
not raise any objection to the Court proceedings at the
meeting or at any time prior to this appeal on the ground that
there had been ex parte or improper contacts between the
government and the Court.
Following Marino’s statements, Judge Rambo
expressed her perception that, based on the facts known to
her, Brown and Grass seemed equally to blame for the
wrongdoing at Rite Aid, and that she did not understand why
the government was treating Brown more favorably than
Grass.  Judge Rambo continued, “Now if there are facts that
you have that you are going to present that wipe away that
perception, then fine.  I don’t have that.”  Id. at 460.
Despite Judge Rambo’s reservations, the transcript of
the chambers conference suggests that during the period
between when she sent the parties her letter and statement of
reasons and the following day’s conference, she had become
more willing to consider accepting Brown’s plea agreement.
On one occasion, Judge Rambo stated she had “no problem
accepting the plea” and that even if she did not accept the
agreement, Brown would not receive a sentence heavier than
he otherwise would receive, so long as the District Court’s
Guidelines calculation comported with that arrived at by the
government.  Id. at 458.  On the second occasion, Judge
Rambo stated she had “no problem with the plea,” but that she
“wanted to see what the guidelines were and then look at the
plea in conjunction with the presentence report” as she had
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done with Grass.  Id. at 461.  Additionally, Judge Rambo
never read aloud her statement of reasons for rejecting the
plea agreement even though her June 25 letter indicated her
intent to do so.  Nevertheless, Weingarten concluded the
chambers meeting by reiterating that, in light of Judge
Rambo’s June 25 letter and statement of reasons, Brown was
unwilling at that point to enter a guilty plea.  
Several hours after the June 26 meeting, Judge Rambo
entered an order granting Brown until July 14, 2003, to notify
the Court of his plea decision.  Of course, inasmuch as Brown
did not plead guilty, the case ultimately proceeded to trial.
The record does not reflect that there were any further plea
negotiations between Brown and the government following
the chambers conference and does not reveal how Brown
communicated his decision not to enter a guilty plea to the
Court. 
4. Application of Rule 11(c)(1)
Brown first contends that the District Court violated
Rule 11(c)(1)’s prohibition on judicial participation in plea
negotiations.  That rule allows an attorney for the government
to discuss and reach a plea agreement with the defendant’s
attorney, but provides that “[t]he court must not participate in
these discussions.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).  When a
defendant makes a Rule 11 objection for the first time on
appeal, a court of appeals reviews the alleged violation on a
If there is a timely objection in the district court to an alleged25
Rule 11 violation, a court of appeals exercises plenary review in
determining whether there had been a violation.  United States
v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2002).  Nevertheless, a
court of appeals still will consider the record as a whole to
determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial
rights or was merely harmless.  See id. at 191; Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(h).  We note that the use of the plain error standard is not
without its critics.  See United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366,
371-72 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  Here, however, our result would be
the same regardless of whether we exercise plain error or
plenary review.
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plain error basis.   To succeed under this standard of review,25
a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the asserted violation of
Rule 11(c)(1) was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; if these three
conditions are met, then a court may exercise its discretion to
notice the forfeited error, but only if (4) “the error seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”  See United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453,
461 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993)).
Brown claims the District Court violated the “core
values” of Rule 11 by holding ex parte discussions with the
government on the day that the Court received the plea
agreement, and that the Court violated the letter of Rule
11(c)(1) by agreeing at the chambers conference to the
government’s proposal to provide further factual information
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which might lead the Court to later accept the agreement.
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 85.
According to the government, the record does not
establish that there were any ex parte discussions between the
government and the District Court, and that even if there were
such discussions, Brown did not raise a contemporaneous
objection when he became aware of them, and he cannot
establish now that as a result of those discussions there was
plain error.  The government also contends that the Court did
not involve itself improperly in the plea discussions, noting
that the Court’s alleged involvement arose after Brown had
entered into the plea agreement with the government.
The courts have viewed Rule 11’s ban on judicial
participation in plea agreements as serving several purposes:
First, it diminishes the possibility of judicial
coercion of a guilty plea, regardless whether the
coercion would actually result in an involuntary
guilty plea.  Second, the judge’s involvement in
the negotiations is apt to diminish the judge’s
impartiality.  By encouraging a particular
agreement, the judge may feel personally
involved, and thus, resent the defendant’s
rejection of his advice. Third, the judge’s
participation creates a misleading impression of
his role in the proceedings. The judge’s role
seems more like an advocate for the agreement
than a neutral arbiter if he joins in the
negotiations.
We take the government’s point to be that, since an ex parte26
communication clearly would have been improper, Marino’s
comments could not mean that such communications took place
because no one would be inclined to admit to that kind of ethical
breach.  We do not take the government’s suggestion to be that
if it had engaged in improper conduct the wise approach for it
thereafter would have been to keep quiet about what had
happened.  We trust that if the government came to recognize
that it had acted improperly in a prosecution, it would reveal the
facts and then let the matter proceed to an appropriate outcome.
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United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 644-45 (4th
Cir. 2002)).  We consider Brown’s Rule 11(c)(1) challenge in
light of these purposes.
The record, in particular Judge Rambo’s June 25, 2003
letter to AUSA Daniel and Marino’s statements at the
chambers conference the next day,  permits an inference that
the government communicated with the District Court on June
25, 2003—the day it forwarded the plea agreement to the
Court and the day before the chambers conference—although
the context of these communications if they did occur is not
immediately apparent.  The government  attempts to deny that
there were such communications, arguing that the statements
in the record are susceptible to multiple interpretations and
that it would have been “extremely unlikely” and “foolish”
for Marino to mention such conversations in the presence of
defense counsel.  See Appellee’s Br. at 78-79.   Assuming26
that there were ex parte communications, however, Brown’s
experienced counsel apparently did not view them as
Brown’s attorneys on this appeal were not representing him in27
June 2003.
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problematic, or at least decided not to object to them if he did
view them as improper, as he did not raise any objection
either upon receiving Judge Rambo’s June 25 letter or upon
hearing Marino’s statements at the chambers conference on
June 26 or at any time thereafter.   27
After our study of the record of what happened after
Judge Rambo sent her June 25 letter, we are satisfied that
Judge Rambo did not violate Rule 11(c)(1) as neither the
alleged ex parte communications nor Judge Rambo’s
statements at the chambers conference took place until after
Brown and the government had finalized the plea agreement.
See Baker, 489 F.3d at 371 (there is “no room for doubt” that
the “purpose and meaning” of Rule 11(c)(1)’s injunction on
judicial involvement in plea negotiations “are that the
sentencing judge should take no part whatever in any
discussion or communication regarding the sentence to be
imposed prior to . . . submission to him of a plea agreement”)
(quoting United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir.
1976)).  Here, by June 25, 2003, the plea negotiations were
over and there was no risk that judicial pressure was going to
influence the outcome of those negotiations.  Moreover, it is
unclear how any ex parte conversations would have harmed
Brown given the government’s attempt persuade the Court to
accept the plea bargain to which Brown had agreed.
Rule 11(c)(1) seeks to avoid a situation in which a
court places pressure on a defendant to plead guilty
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involuntarily.  In this case, Judge Rambo’s position led to the
collapse of the plea agreement and had the opposite effect.
Thus, though Brown may have lost the benefit of his bargain
with the government because of Judge Rambo’s position, he
did not lose his right to be tried by an impartial jury of his
peers and he surely was not coerced to plead guilty.  In fact,
quite to the contrary, Judge Rambo’s actions caused him to
adhere to his previously entered plea of not guilty even
though he had been prepared to change his plea to guilty.
Accordingly, even if we agreed with Brown that Judge
Rambo violated the letter of Rule 11(c)(1) by discussing the
plea negotiations at the chambers conference and agreeing to
allow the government to provide additional factual
information in support of a plea agreement, such error was
harmless given that the parties did not reach a subsequent plea
agreement.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h).
5. Abuse of Discretion Standard
Brown also contends that the District Court improperly
rejected the plea agreement by distributing the letter to AUSA
Daniel with the attached “statement of reasons” to counsel on
June 25, 2003.  On this point we first observe that the record
by no means is clear that the Court ever rejected the plea
agreement.  The reality may be that Brown simply abandoned
the agreement when he became aware of the Court’s view of
it.  However, assuming that the letter and statement of reasons
constituted a rejection of the plea agreement, we review the
District Court’s rejection of Brown’s plea agreement for an
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Hecht, 638 F.2d
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651, 658 (3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498
(1971)); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Walker,
261 F.3d 370, 375 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A sentencing court can, of
course, reject the results of a plea negotiation if it concludes
that the resulting agreement is not in the best interest of
justice.”).  
On the question of whether the District Court rejected
the plea agreement it is clear that, on its face, Judge Rambo’s
June 25 letter and her accompanying “statement of reasons”
would lead most reasonable readers to believe that the
rejection of Brown’s plea agreement was a foregone
conclusion.  By the next day, however, Judge Rambo clearly
indicated a willingness to consider the plea agreement at the
chambers conference.  In this regard the record indicates that
when Judge Rambo originally read that the plea agreement
suggested that Brown’s timely acceptance of responsibility
had permitted the Court to allocate its resources efficiently,
she reacted negatively, but by the next day she had softened
her views. 
Yet we need not determine if Judge Rambo actually
rejected the plea agreement for even if we construe the
“statement of reasons” as a formal rejection, she did not abuse
her discretion in rejecting the agreement.  Brown argues that
Judge Rambo in issuing her “statement of reasons” abused her
discretion because she displayed a predisposition to find
Brown guilty and impose a substantial penalty, and because
she improperly based her decision to reject the plea agreement
on the circumstance that she and her staff had spent
Brown also makes the novel assertion that once the District28
Court acknowledged the government’s prerogative to dismiss
certain counts in the indictment against Brown—i.e., the counts
other than Count 33 for conspiracy to obstruct justice—the plea
agreement became a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement that the Court
was compelled to accept.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A)
(court has discretion to reject agreements under Rule
11(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(C)); In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 784-89
(3d Cir. 2000) (narrowly construing Rule 48’s requirement that
“leave of court” be obtained before a prosecution may be
dismissed).  With the exception of Richards, which did not
involve plea agreements, Brown does not cite authority for this
position.  In any event, Brown’s argument fails at the outset
because, although the Court in its June 25 letter to AUSA Daniel
did state it would accept Brown’s guilty plea to Count 33, it did
so while expressing its intention to reject all other aspects of the
agreement.  Moreover, even though the Court at the next day’s
chambers conference did seem willing to accept the entire plea
agreement, it never acknowledged that the government
possessed a unilateral right to dismiss the remaining counts in
the indictment because the plea agreement did not grant the
government any such right.  In the agreement, the government
agreed to move to dismiss the remaining counts upon entry of
Brown’s guilty plea to the conspiracy count.  Dismissal still
hinged on the Court’s granting of the government’s motion,
which it never could do because the government never filed the
motion.  Hence, the agreement remained subject to Rule
11(c)(1)(A) and thus the Court had discretion to accept, reject,
or defer a decision on the agreement until after its review of the
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substantial time and effort preparing for Brown’s trial.   We28
presentence report.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
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disagree.  The grand jury charged Brown with an array of
felonies which allegedly resulted in very serious financial
harm to the Rite Aid Corporation and its shareholders, as well
as obstruction of justice and witness tampering.  The
indictment charged Brown and Grass equally, and alleged
they both were more culpable than Bergonzi and Sorkin.  Yet
the government in Judge Rambo’s view inexplicably offered
Brown a significantly more lenient plea agreement than it did
Grass.  Although Judge Rambo spoke harshly in describing
why she felt Brown’s plea agreement did not serve the
interests of justice, if she actually rejected the plea agreement
she did not abuse her discretion by so doing.
Brown draws our attention to Judge Rambo’s
statement that she found “particularly nauseating” the portion
of the plea agreement indicating that the government would
move for a reduction in Brown’s offense level because
Brown’s timely acceptance of responsibility had allowed the
government and the District Court to allocate their resources
efficiently.  Judge Rambo noted that Brown’s decision to
enter a plea agreement on almost the eve of trial had by no
means prevented the Court and its staff from expending
considerable effort preparing for trial.  Brown reads these
statements to mean that Judge Rambo rejected the plea
agreement because of the time the Court had spent on trial
preparation.  Though we can understand why a district court
would be frustrated if, after it expended great efforts to
prepare for a trial, the parties in effect settled the case, as the
court might wonder why they could not have reached their
We are not suggesting that there never could be a situation in29
which a court appropriately could not reject a plea agreement on
the basis of its untimeliness.
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agreement earlier, we agree that ordinarily it would be
improper for a court to reject a plea agreement solely because
of its annoyance attributable to the parties’ delay in reaching
an agreement.    The record demonstrates, however, that29
Judge Rambo’s comments regarding timing referred
specifically to the proposed Sentencing Guidelines 3-level
reduction for Brown’s timely acceptance of responsibility,
and not to the acceptability of the plea agreement generally.
Judge Rambo’s hostility to this proposed reduction, though
expressed harshly, was certainly understandable given the
circumstances of the case of which she was well aware.  In
fact, we, too, cannot understand how the parties seriously can
have recited in the plea agreement that Brown’s acceptance of
responsibility was timely.  After considering all of Brown’s
arguments, we find no abuse of discretion in the District
Court’s reaction to Brown’s plea agreement.
D. The Sentence
The District Court sentenced Brown, who was 76 years
old, to a ten-year term of imprisonment.  Brown argues that
he is entitled to a remand for resentencing because this
sentence, which the Court imposed after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct.
2531 (2004), but before its decision in United States v.
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Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, was unreasonable in a
variety of ways.  Specifically, Brown contends that the
District Court abused its sentencing discretion by (1) failing
to consider properly the factors listed at 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)
or articulate a statement of reasons for the sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), (2) improperly calculating the loss for
which he was responsible under Section 2B1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines, and (3) wrongly denying his motion
for a downward departure based on his medical condition.
1. The Sentencing Proceedings
Following Brown’s conviction, the Probation Office
submitted a presentence report (“PSR”) to the District Court.
The PSR calculated Brown’s base offense level at 6, but then
included a 16-level enhancement based on the amount of
financial loss for which Brown was responsible, calculated to
be $38,113,383; a 2-level enhancement because the offense
involved more than minimal planning; a 4-level enhancement
because Brown was an organizer and leader of the conspiracy
to obstruct justice; a 2-level enhancement for abuse of a
position of trust; and a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of
justice.  Accordingly, the PSR calculated Brown’s total
offense level at 32, with a corresponding sentencing range of
121-151 months.  
Brown filed objections to the PSR on the grounds that
the loss calculation was incorrect and that the enhancement
for an aggravated role in the offenses was improper.  Brown
also filed two motions for downward departures based on his
The court in Croxford held that application of the Guidelines29
would be unconstitutional pursuant to Blakely, and thus it
approached the sentencing determination “as the courts handled
sentencing before the Guidelines-by making a full examination
of the relevant evidence and imposing an appropriate sentence
within the statutory range set by Congress.”  324 F. Supp. 2d at
1246.  The Croxford court nevertheless determined what the
sentencing range would be under the Guidelines and looked to
that range for guidance.  Id. at 1248-49.
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extraordinary civic and charitable contributions and on his age
and physical condition.  After holding two days of evidentiary
hearings, the District Court entered a Memorandum Opinion
discussing sentencing issues on August 17, 2004.  See United
States v. Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d 552 (M.D. Pa. 2004).  
In that opinion, the District Court concluded that, in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely, the
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines to
Brown’s case was unconstitutional.  The Court nevertheless
used the Sentencing Guidelines as a “measuring point” for its
analysis, but stated that it would base its ultimate sentencing
determination on an “indeterminate scheme in accordance
with the principles set forth” by a decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah in United States
v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004).   Brown,29
338 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56.  The Court stated it would not
issue an “alternative Guidelines sentence,” but it nevertheless
addressed Brown’s challenges to the PSR, overruling his
objections and denying his motions for downward departure.
Id. at 556-62.  With respect to the loss calculation, the District
57
Court accepted over Brown’s objection the PSR’s use of an
“average selling price methodology” for determining the
amount of shareholder loss that resulted from Brown’s fraud,
noting that other courts had sanctioned this method of loss
calculation in recent accounting fraud decisions.  Id. at 557
(citing United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir.
2002); United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866
(N.D. Cal. 2002)).  Brown urged reliance on his expert, who
conducted “an event study, which measures the out-of-pocket
damages to investors by calculating the difference between
the fraudulent mis-pricing in the price paid for the security
and the inflation in the sales price,” and calculated that there
was no shareholder loss attributable to Brown’s fraud.
Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
As described by the District Court, the average selling
price method “attempts to estimate the effect inflated earnings
had upon the value of the company’s shares by comparing the
average selling price of the stock during the lifetime of the
fraud to the average selling price after the fraud was disclosed
or corrected via a restatement.”  Id. at 557 (citing Bakhit, 218
F. Supp. 2d at 1241).  “Once an average loss per share has
been established, it is multiplied by the number of harmed
shares to estimate the total shareholder loss.”  Id. (citing
Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1242).  To calculate the loss
attributable to Brown’s misconduct, the Court’s methodology
looked at six-, seven-, and eight-day windows before and after
Rite Aid’s October 18, 1999 announcement that it intended to
restate its income.  The average losses per share over these
three time periods then were multiplied by the total number of
“innocent shares” (the total number of shares minus those
It is unclear why the District Court focused solely on averages30
of arbitrary multi-day windows surrounding the October 18,
1999 announcement, given that Rite Aid’s stock price was in a
period of continuous decline both before and after this date, and
that the effect of Brown’s fraud on Rite Aid’s stock price began
at least as early as June 1, 1999, when Rite Aid reported its
income for fiscal year 1999 to the SEC.  Under a typical average
selling price approach to loss calculation, sometimes referred to
as a “rescissory” or “modified rescissory” approach, a court will
calculate the average selling price of the security over the entire
life of the fraud (the “average fraud price”) and the average
selling price during a period—often several weeks or
more—following the fraud’s revelation (the “average post-fraud
price”) then subtract the average post-fraud price from the
average fraud price.  The resulting loss per share then is
multiplied by the number of affected shares to derive the total
loss figure.  See Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-42; Kevin P.
McCormick, Untangling the Capricious Effects of Market Loss
in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1145, 1165-66
(2008); Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial
Reporting Fraud, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1611, 1635-36 (2007).
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held by the Rite Aid defendants), reduced by the percentage
of the total fraud for which Brown was responsible.  The
separate figures for the six-, seven-, and eight-day windows
then were averaged to arrive at the final loss figure.30
Although the District Court accepted the PSR’s
methodology, it did disagree with the PSR’s loss calculation
in two respects, as it found that the amount of loss attributable
to Brown’s fraud should be discounted by a dividend Rite Aid
Brown also objected to the PSR’s loss calculation including31
amounts from rebate and settlement agreements that Rite Aid
fraudulently had listed as income in its financial disclosures, and
to the amount of loss attributable to the backdated severance
letters.  Additionally, Brown objected to the 4-level offense
level enhancement based on his aggravated role.  The District
Court overruled all of these objections.
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paid to its shareholders on October 14, 1999, and that the
government overestimated the number of shares harmed by
Brown’s fraud.  After accounting for these adjustments, the
Court determined that the amount of loss for which Brown
was responsible was $23,170,452.  The Court noted that this
revision of the loss amount would not affect Brown’s
sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, as his
overall offense level remained at 32.  31
 The District Court denied Brown’s motion for a
downward departure based on his medical condition because
it concluded that Brown “did not meet his burden of
establishing that the Bureau of Prisons could not provide
appropriate medical care for a person of [Brown]’s age and
physical condition.”  Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 562.  The
Court likewise denied Brown’s motion for a downward
departure based on his charitable and civic contributions,
finding that although Brown was generous in these regards,
his contributions were not extraordinary given his financial
means.  
The District Court imposed Brown’s sentence at a
hearing on October 14, 2004.  At the hearing, the Court
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rejected additional sentencing objections that Brown raised
with respect to his vulnerability to abuse and his medical
condition.  The Court noted with respect to Brown’s medical
condition that many defendants have similar problems and, in
its experience, the federal prison system was very capable of
dealing with defendants in Brown’s situation.  The Court also
addressed Brown’s charitable deeds, and, although it already
had rejected his motion for a downward departure predicated
on those deeds, the Court stated that Brown’s “good deeds are
very much acknowledge[d] . . . and I believe that is addressed
in the sentence that will be given.”  App. at 94-95.  The Court
then sentenced Brown to a term of imprisonment of 120
months, one month below the minium Guidelines range.
2. Post-Booker Sentencing Requirements
In considering a challenge to a district court’s
sentencing decision, we engage in two levels of review.  First,
we must ensure that the district court did not commit a
significant procedural error in arriving at its decision, “such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.”   United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d
207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007)).  We review alleged
factual errors for clear error but exercise plenary review over
“purely legal” errors, such as a misinterpretation of the
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Guidelines or the governing case law.  United States v.
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2009).
Second, if we determine that there has not been a significant
procedural error, we review the ultimate sentence imposed to
determine if it was substantively reasonable under an abuse of
discretion standard.  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218 (citing Gall, 552
U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597). 
As we have indicated, the District Court imposed
Brown’s sentence after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, but
prior to its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
125 S.Ct 738.  In similar circumstances in other cases, we
have remanded the case for resentencing unless the district
court followed the procedures required after Booker.  See
United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2007),
vacated on other grounds,      U.S.     , 129 S.Ct. 1558 (2009).
We have held that these procedures require that in setting a
sentence a district court must (1) calculate the applicable
Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on any departure motions,
and (3) exercise its post-Booker discretion by considering the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in setting the sentence it
imposes regardless whether it varies from the sentence
calculated under the Guidelines.  United States. v. Olhovsky,
562 F.3d 530, 546-47 (3d Cir. 2009). 
3. Unreasonableness of the Sentence
Following Blakely, a district court must consider the
factors that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) enumerates before sentencing
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a defendant.  Those factors include the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history of the defendant, and
the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct.  Additionally, the court must impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from the
defendant’s further crimes, and provide the defendant with
needed treatment, training, or care.  
“While sentencing courts need not discuss each of the
§ 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the
factors into account in sentencing, where . . . the record
strongly suggests that some of the statutorily prescribed
sentencing factors were ignored, we cannot conclude that the
resulting sentence was reasonable.”  Olhovsky, 562 F.3d at
547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir.
2009) (en banc) (“In the wake of Booker, it is essential . . .
that district courts provide courts of appeals with an
explanation sufficient for [them] to see that the particular
circumstances of the case have been given meaningful
consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a).”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here the District
Court, based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Blakely,
correctly determined that the mandatory application of the
Guidelines to Brown’s sentence would be unconstitutional.
The Court, however, being conducted by a judge not a
prophet, was unable precisely to predict the effect that the
Supreme Court’s eventual holding in Booker would have on
With respect to the District Court’s loss calculation, however,32
we note that the legal landscape has changed somewhat since
the time of Brown’s sentencing.  Notably, two courts of appeals
explicitly now have applied the loss calculation principles that
the Supreme Court has required in civil securities fraud cases,
see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125
S.Ct. 1627 (2005), in the criminal sentencing context, United
States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2007); United
States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546-49 (5th Cir. 2005), another has
opined that such an application would be appropriate, United
States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2009), and
a fourth has held that although a sentencing court need not
follow Dura Pharmaceuticals’s loss causation approach, it
nevertheless must determine “how much of the shareholders’
loss was actually caused by [defendant]’s fraud.”  United States
v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added).
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federal sentencing.  Lacking this clairvoyance the Court failed
to explain, in the manner now required, how it considered the
factors listed in section 3553(a) in imposing Brown’s
sentence.  For this reason, we must remand the case to the
District Court for resentencing.  Because we remand for
resentencing on this ground, we express no opinion on
Brown’s remaining sentencing arguments which, of course,
he can advance at his resentencing.32
V.  CONCLUSION
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For the reasons we set forth above, we will affirm the
judgment of conviction but will vacate the sentence entered
by the District Court on October 15, 2004, and we will
remand the case for resentencing in accordance with this
opinion.  We will affirm the order denying Brown’s motion
for a new trial entered by the District Court on August 10,
2005, and the order denying Brown’s renewed motion for a
new trial or for dismissal of the indictment entered by the
District Court on February 22, 2008. 
